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An Amendment to Protect Marriage: Bad in Theory, 
Likely Worse in Practice 
 
Mark Strasser*
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Passing a federal constitutional amendment to protect marriage was a 
bad idea when initially proposed and, given how some of the recent state 
constitutional amendments have been interpreted, is a worse idea now. 
The Federal Marriage Protection Amendment (FMPA) was so open to 
interpretation that individuals deciding whether to vote for it did not 
know what it included and thus whether it deserved their support. 
Further, when one considers how the federal courts have interpreted the 
plain language of an existing constitutional provision, one can see that 
even had the FMPA been better crafted, there would have been no basis 
for confidence that the current difficulties in interpretation would thereby 
have been averted. 
Part II of this article examines some of the difficulties posed by the 
current amendment and suggests that the reach of the amendment is far 
from clear, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Part III 
considers some of the interpretations that have been offered of the 
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and of various 
state amendments, arguing that these interpretations foreshadow some of 
the broad interpretations of the amendment that will be offered by some 
courts. The Article concludes that the Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment, both as it has been proposed and as it likely will appear if 
there is a modified proposal, should not be passed. 
 
II.  THE AMBIGUOUS FMPA 
 
While seeming clear at first, the Federal Marriage Protection 
Amendment is open to a variety of interpretations that would 
significantly affect its reach. Commentators do not seem to appreciate 
the multiple interpretations that it might be given and thus both the range 
of interests that it might impact and the difficulties that would face 
anyone who wished to seriously consider whether the amendment should 
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be passed. Until these difficulties are addressed, it will be impossible 
even for many of those who believe that marriage should be reserved for 
different-sex couples1 to make an informed decision about whether the 
amendment is worthy of support. 
 
A.  The Federal Marriage Protection Amendment 
 
This past year, the following amendment, mirroring the 2004 Federal 
Marriage Amendment, was proposed: 
 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man 
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any 
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and 
a woman.2
 
On its face, the amendment appears to preclude a judge from finding 
that a state constitution or the United States Constitution protects the 
right of same-sex couples to marry or to receive benefits commonly 
understood to be reserved for married couples. However, the clarity of 
this amendment is illusory. Because there is no defined set of benefits 
which qualify as “the incidents of marriage,” individuals deciding 
whether to support the amendment have no way of knowing which 
fundamental interests of the unmarried would be precluded by the 
amendment from having constitutional protection. 
The FMPA did not command the necessary majority when proposed 
although it seems likely that some version of the amendment will again 
be offered.3 While it is difficult to predict what the exact wording of any 
future amendment will be, it seems safe to assume that certain features of 
the FMPA will again be included when it or some version of it is 
considered in Congress.4 Thus, an examination of the FMPA may well be 
 
 1. See Marc Spindelman, Yale, 102 MICH L REV. 1747, 1769 n.111 (2004) (discussing Orrin 
Hatch’s suggestion that a federal marriage amendment should be adopted to protect democratic self-
government). 
 2. See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2005), 151 CONG. REC. S146-01.The amendment 
mirrors S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (July 7, 2004), so comments made about the latter amendment (the 
Federal Marriage Amendment) would also apply to the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment. 
 3. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional 
Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of 
Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 604 (2005) (“DeLay suggests that the same-sex 
marriage issue ‘is going to be huge’ in the future.”).
 4. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to 
Federalism in Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 167 (2004). 
The form and wording may continue to evolve and improve. Regardless of the particular 
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helpful in assessing the wisdom of future proposed amendments. 
When construing a statute, one must first consider the text itself.5 
Suppose we consider what the amendment would mean without the 
phrase “or the legal incidents thereof.” Presumably, it would be 
construed to mean that neither any state constitution nor the United 
States Constitution should be interpreted to require that the status of 
marriage be conferred upon any union of individuals not involving one 
man and one woman.6 While the focus of the discussion here will not be 
on this part of the amendment, one point might be made about the 
proposed amendment even if the legal incidents language has been 
removed, namely that it cannot correctly be characterized as simply 
preventing “activist judges” from imposing their will on the American 
people.7
A common interpretation of the first sentence of the amendment is 
that no state will be permitted to recognize same-sex marriage.8 This 
does not merely mean that “activist judges” are precluded from holding, 
for example, that a state constitution protects this right, but also that the 
populace of a particular state will be precluded from amending their own 
state constitution to protect the right of same-sex couples to marry. 
Commentators might point out that the FMPA says nothing about 
what individuals are permitted to do with respect to ballot initiatives and 
that the electorate of a particular state could, in fact, amend their own 
state constitution to include a right to same-sex marriage. That is true but 
irrelevant. Basically, if the FMPA were interpreted to preclude states 
from protecting the right of same-sex couples to marry,9 then the state 
wording or version, the gist of the FMA is that marriage is defined as a conjugal union 
exclusively, that the courts may not compel the extension of marital status or of marital 
incidents, benefits, duties, rights, and privileges that constitute the corpus of legal 
marriage to other kinds of domestic unions, but that legislatures may resolve questions 
about whether and if so what other status and/or what benefits may be extended to 
nonmarital relationships. 
Id. 
 5. Daniel B. Kelly, Recent Development, Defining Extortion: Rico, Hobbs, and Statutory 
Interpretation in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003), 26 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 953, 969 (2003) (discussing one “of the few generally accepted concrete 
rules of statutory construction: namely, . . . begin with the text of the statute”). 
 6. A separate issue beyond the purview of this article is whether this amendment would 
permit a state to ignore a status already conferred. 
 7. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Restoring Democratic Self-Governance through the Federal 
Marriage Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 110 (2004) (“The amendment must do three things. 
First, it must protect the most important right of every citizen—the right of political self-
governance.”); cf. Wardle, supra note 4, at 164-65 (“[A] significant minority of activist judges desire 
to force the states to accept same-sex marriage or marriage-like unions.”). 
 8. See Collett, supra note 7, at 112 (stating “the current language is clear in its prohibition 
of same-sex marriage”). 
 9. The amendment might be read only to preclude the federal government from protecting 
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constitutional amendment described above could be passed but would 
likely be held unenforceable by the courts because of the Supremacy 
Clause of the Federal Constitution.10 Yet, if the first sentence of the 
amendment precludes states from amending their own constitutions to 
protect same-sex marriage, then the FMPA may be thwarting, rather than 
protecting, self-government. Were FMPA proponents really concerned 
about protecting the right of self-determination, they would delete the 
first sentence of the proposed amendment. 
Certainly, it might be pointed out that there does not seem to be a 
huge outpouring of support in any state for amending that state’s 
constitution to protect the right of same-sex couples to marry.11 That is 
beside the point. The question is not merely what people think now but 
what they may think in the future. Basically, the FMPA prevents the 
future electorate of any state from expressing its will by voting to extend 
constitutional protection to same-sex unions.12
Let us bracket this anti-democratic effect of the amendment for the 
moment and instead ask, “What is added to the amendment by including 
the phrase involving the legal incidents of marriage?” At least two 
different points require clarification: 
(1) Which benefits and obligations in particular are picked out by the 
phrase “legal incidents of marriage?” 
(2) What effect would this amendment have with respect to these 
benefits? 
Some commentators believe that the first question is not necessary to 
ask, claiming that the term “incidents of marriage” is used routinely and 
that its meaning is clear.13 Yet, the fact that the term is used often does 
not establish that the term is used in the same way each time. Indeed, 
some courts discussing the “incidents of marriage” have not been 
referring to particular benefits at all but instead have merely been 
discussing whether the court has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Jones is legally separated from 
her husband. She now is domiciled in State A, whereas her husband is 
still living in the state where he has always lived—State B. Jones can 
such a right. 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 11. Cf. Collett, supra note 7, at 95 (“Public opinion polls show that Americans agree that 
marriage should be defined as only the union of one man and one woman—often by a margin of two 
to one.”). 
 12. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783, 
797 (2004) (“The FMA would add to the Constitution a provision which restricts the ability of the 
states to protect the fundamental right of marriage.”). 
 13. See Collett, supra note 7 at 111-12 (“Opponents also argue that the phrase ‘legal 
incidents’ of marriage is unclear and will require extensive judicial interpretation. Yet this is a 
phrase that has been used routinely in the discussion of marital rights.”). 
  
387] BAD IN THEORY, LIKELY WORSE IN PRACTICE 391 
divorce her husband in her current domicile, notwithstanding that her 
husband is not a domiciliary of State A and, indeed, has no contacts with 
the state. The State A court, when deciding that it has jurisdiction to 
grant the divorce, might use the term “incidents of marriage” to indicate 
that the marriage itself is before the court and thus that the court has 
jurisdiction to hear the case.14
Sometimes, the term “incidents of marriage” is used quite broadly15 
and, it seems, this is the preferred interpretation of some commentators. 
Yet, even when the term is being used broadly, formulations may differ 
with respect to which benefits are included within the grouping 
“incidents of marriage,” and thus litigation would likely follow the 
passage of such an amendment, protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding.16
Consider the following formulations: Maggie Gallagher writes, 
“Most of what are now routinely described as marriage benefits are more 
accurately described as legal incidents of marriage: ways in which the 
law treats a couple differently if they are married than if they are not.”17 
Professor Collett offers a somewhat different description, suggesting that 
“‘Legal incidents of marriage’ is . . . a phrase that indicates the rights, 
privileges, duties, and responsibilities that arise from the legal 
relationship of marriage.”18 Professor Wardle may be offering yet 
another definition of the phrase when suggesting that these are the 
“benefits, duties, rights, and privileges that constitute the corpus of legal 
marriage.”19 
  While not making explicit which are the benefits, duties, etc., that 
“constitute the corpus of marriage,” Professor Wardle may be 
 
 14. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 711-12 (N.Y. 1965), quoted in Perrin 
v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1969). 
Since he was one party to the two-party contract of marriage he carried with him legal 
incidents of the marriage itself, considered as an entity, which came before the court 
when he personally appeared and presented his petition. In a highly mobile era such as 
ours, it is needful on pragmatic grounds to regard the marriage itself as moving from 
place to place with either spouse . . . . 
Id. 
 15. Cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting). 
This court should not manufacture a civil right which is unsupported by any precedent, 
and whose legal incidents—the entitlement to those statutory benefits—will reach beyond 
the right to enter into a legal marriage and overturn long standing public policy 
encompassing other areas of public concern. 
Id. 
 16. See Collett, supra note 7, at 111-12 (suggesting that extensive litigation would not be 
required to resolve the meaning of the term). 
 17. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A 
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 38 (2004). 
 18. Collett, supra note 7, at 111-12. 
 19. Wardle, supra note 4, at 167. 
  
392 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
 
distinguishing between what is essential to marriage and what simply 
happens to be accorded to married individuals. If so, that would mean 
that the benefits which merely happen to be accorded to married people 
would not be included among the incidents of marriage as he defines the 
term, whereas Professor Collett’s formulation offers no such 
qualification. 
Suppose that a state were to accord particular benefits to all 
household members. Would such a benefit be considered an incident of 
marriage because it is something to which one might become entitled as 
a result of marrying, or would it not be an incident of marriage because 
unmarried individuals would also be entitled to it? If the incidents of 
marriage are those benefits which one receives by virtue of marrying 
and, for example, one is treated as a household member by virtue of 
marrying someone, then benefits accorded to household members might 
be thought of as incidents of marriage. If, on the other hand, the incidents 
of marriage are limited to those benefits which capture some essential 
element of marriage, then the fact that unmarried individuals, e.g., people 
who were merely living together, might also be entitled to a particular 
benefit would speak to the benefit’s not being classified as an incident of 
marriage. 
If the incidents of marriage must be associated with an important or, 
perhaps, an intrinsic element of marriage, then it will be necessary to 
decide which benefits meet that standard. Presumably, this matter would 
have to be worked out in the courts, which means that there would likely 
have to be a substantial amount of litigation to determine which benefits 
would count as incidents and which would not. 
Suppose that we adopt Maggie Gallagher’s proposal and just see 
which benefits accorded to married couples are not accorded to non-
marital couples. This would have some unusual implications, one of 
which is that some states simply would not have incidents of marriage. 
For example, consider Connecticut and Vermont, whose legislatures 
have passed legislation creating civil unions.20 Civil unions accord to 
same-sex couples all of the benefits and obligations that are accorded to 
married couples. In these states, where no benefits are specially reserved 
for married couples, there would seem to be no incidents of marriage 
using Maggie Gallagher’s definition. 
Perhaps this is not an unwelcome result. In some states, the phrase 
 20. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(a) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same 
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative 
or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a 
marriage.”); see also Susan Haigh, Connecticut OKs gay civil unions; Grants same-sex pairs the 
rights of married couples; bars weddings, REC. N. N.J., Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 WLNR 6298288 
(noting that Connecticut will start recognizing civil unions as of October 1, 2005). 
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“incidents of marriage” would not pick out any particular benefits, which 
would mean not only that the legislature could accord those benefits, but 
also that a court might find that those benefits had to be accorded as a 
matter of constitutional right. In other states, however, the phrase 
“incidents of marriage” would pick out particular benefits. In those 
states, unmarried individuals would be barred from claiming those 
benefits as a matter of constitutional right. 
Commentators might disagree with the analysis set forth here. They 
might suggest that the FMPA would preclude a Vermont court from 
finding that a particular benefit of marriage had to be extended to non-
marital couples as a matter of constitutional right. After all, the 
amendment states that no “constitution of any State shall be construed to 
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any 
union other than the union of a man and a woman,”21 and it might turn 
out that the majority of states consider the right to elect against a will, for 
example, as an incident of marriage. 
Yet, the focus of discussion here is how to determine which benefits 
are incidents of marriage. If the incidents of marriage involve those 
benefits reserved by a state for married couples, then it will not matter 
what other states do—it will only matter which benefits are reserved for 
married individuals by the particular state whose law is being challenged. 
It is precisely for this reason that the FMPA puts no limitation on what 
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution protects,22 
since no state benefits are reserved exclusively for married couples in 
Vermont. Of course, there might well have been a limitation on the 
courts before the Vermont Legislature passed the civil union bill, which 
means that had the FMPA been in effect at the time Baker v. State23 was 
issued, the decision might have been much different.24
Were we to have a federal law which determined who could marry 
whom and which benefits were included among the incidents of 
marriage, then we might refer to that statute to see whether a particular 
benefit was an incident of marriage and thus could be reserved for 
married couples without offending constitutional guarantees. Of course, 
this would not resolve all of the issues, since a separate question would 
be whether the amendment would be referring to those benefits 
considered incidents of marriage at the time of the amendment’s 
 21. See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2005). 
 22. Cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Common Benefits Clause 
of the Vermont Constitution precluded reserving particular benefits for married couples). 
 23. Baker, 744 A.2d 864. 
 24. At the very least, the Baker court would have to have argued that the Vermont 
Constitution guaranteed to all Vermont citizens certain benefits, none of which qualified as 
“incidents of marriage” as the term was being used in the FMPA. 
  
394 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 20 
adoption or instead, for example, at the time the cause of action accrued. 
In any event, because we do not have a national marriage law,25 we must 
use some other method to determine which benefits count as incidents of 
marriage. 
In a different context, Professor Collett suggests: 
 
Some of the existing arrangements that would still be possible under 
the FMA include Vermont civil unions, Hawaii reciprocal 
beneficiaries, and New Jersey and California domestic partnerships. 
Each is distinctive and responsive to the concerns of the people in the 
state in which the laws were adopted. The FMA does not, and should 
not, preclude such experimentation by the states where it represents the 
will of the people, and is not imposed upon the people through some 
act of willfulness by the judiciary.26
 
The issue of interest here is not whether a legislature could accord a 
variety of benefits to individuals but whether a legislature’s doing so 
might either change the character of the benefit or, perhaps, make clear 
that the benefit in question was never an incident of marriage. Thus, 
suppose a legislature decides to grant Benefit A to unmarried singles or 
couples, not because it was forced to do so by a court but because it 
believed its doing so was good public policy. If “incidents of marriage” 
are reserved for married couples, then Benefit A could not be thought an 
incident of marriage. 
At least a few points are suggested by the above: 
(1) What is an incident of marriage in one state might not be an 
incident of marriage in another, and thus the FMPA might immunize 
 
 25. Perhaps the closest is the Defense of Marriage Act, which specifies some unions which 
will not be considered marriages for federal purposes. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2005). 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband 
and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife. 
Id. 
 26. Collett, supra note 7, at 110; see also Wardle, supra note 4, at 152. 
[T]he Federal Marriage Amendment clearly preserves the authority of legislatures, state 
and federal, to enact laws providing “that (1) marital status or (2) the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups .” Thus, it does not prohibit the 
creation of another legal status equivalent to marriage—called, perhaps, “Civil Unions” 
or “Domestic Partnerships” or “Reciprocal Beneficiaries”—nor does it prohibit the 
extension of the same benefits given married couples to such alternative quasi-marital 
unions, or the extension of any particular marital benefits and “incidents” to any 
heterosexual or same-sex nonmarital couples—so long as it is done by the legislature. 
Wardle, supra note 4, at 152. 
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from constitutional attack a refusal to accord particular benefits to 
unmarried persons in one state but not in another. 
(2) What once was viewed as an incident of marriage might no 
longer be so viewed once the state accorded the benefit at issue to any 
unmarried individuals. Thus, a legislature that accords particular benefits 
to some unmarried individuals would be making the refusal to accord 
those benefits to other unmarried individuals potentially subject to 
constitutional attack, i.e., would nullify the immunity from constitutional 
attack offered by the FMPA. 
(3) Assuming that (2) does not involve a one-way ratchet of some 
sort, a state legislature might be able to reclassify particular benefits as 
incidents of marriage by reserving them only for married individuals. 
There would presumably be some limit on what could be (re)classified as 
an incident of marriage. For example, the state could not classify the 
right to vote as an incident of marriage.27 However, it is simply unclear 
how that limitation would be spelled out. 
By including the term “incidents of marriage” within the proposed 
amendment without spelling out what the phrase means, the amendment 
framers have given the courts a great deal of latitude when determining 
which benefits fall within this category. Perhaps courts will do a state-
by-state analysis, perhaps they will consider which benefits were 
considered incidents of marriage at common law, or perhaps they will 
use some other method. The amendment does not specify, which means 
that it would be difficult for someone deciding whether to favor the 
amendment to know what it is that the amendment immunizes from 
constitutional review. Indeed, some of the benefits that FMPA 
proponents believe are paradigmatic incidents of marriage might not be 
so viewed in a state that permits non-married individuals to receive those 
benefits as well. 
 
B.  What May be Included as Incidents of Marriage 
 
While the amendment does not specify any incidents of marriage or 
even offer a criterion by which courts could make that determination, 
commentators are willing to offer examples of incidents of marriage.28 
 27. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966). 
But, of course, the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise on conditions 
that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the 
Constitution. Such exercises of state power are no more immune to the limitations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than any other state action. The Equal Protection Clause itself 
has been held to forbid some state laws that restrict the right to vote. 
Id. 
 28. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 648 (suggesting that they include 
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Regrettably, it is sometimes difficult to tell why certain benefits are 
thought to be incidents of marriage. It could be, for instance, that some 
benefits are thought to be incidents of marriage because a particular state 
treats them as such, because they were viewed at common law as 
incidents of marriage, or because most states treat the benefits at issue as 
incidents of marriage. Yet, without any elaboration or specification on 
this matter, it is difficult to tell which benefits would be treated as 
incidents of marriage as a federal constitutional matter, should that be 
important to determine in the future. 
Professor Wardle suggests that “the FMA would limit the ability of 
state courts to extend particular benefits of incidents of marriage to 
nonmarital homosexual or heterosexual couples, such as marital 
testimonial privileges, custody, adoption, support, and property 
division.”29 Regrettably, he fails to explain whether, for example, this list 
would be applicable in Vermont, where none of these benefits is reserved 
only for those who have married, or whether, instead, this list would only 
be applicable in a state in which all of these benefits are reserved for 
married couples. 
Let us consider the issue of adoption. Most states permit non-married 
individuals to adopt,30 so adoption is presumably not an incident of 
marriage. In a state permitting second-parent adoptions,31 it would be 
difficult to classify as an incident of marriage an adoption whereby two 
unmarried adults would now be recognized as the parents of the same 
child. Thus, it might be more difficult than first appears to determine 
which benefits would be affected by the amendment. 
The above point can be illustrated by considering a law like 
Florida’s, which precludes many gays and lesbians from adopting.32 
Because Florida permits singles to adopt,33 adoption itself is presumably 
not an incident of marriage. Because it is not an incident of marriage, the 
refusal to permit gays and lesbians to adopt would at least potentially be 
 
“rights to visit a significant other in a hospital, to help make medical decisions if a loved one 
becomes incapacitated, to have the state recognize the existence of parental rights”). 
 29. Wardle, supra note 4, at 167. 
 30. See Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational Basis 
Scrutiny and the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 297, 298 (2003). 
 31. Sara R. David, Turning Parental Rights into Parental Obligations—Holding Same-Sex, 
Non-Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 921, 928 (2005) 
(“Second-parent adoptions are effectively step-parent adoptions that do not require the parents to be 
married.”). 
 32. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(c)(3) (West 2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under 
this statute may adopt if that person is homosexual.”). The statute has been construed only to limit 
those who have been sexually active during the past year with someone of the same sex. See Lofton 
v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Children and Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806-07 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 33. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(b) (West 2002). 
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subject to constitutional challenge even if the FMPA was adopted 
(although a separate issue would be whether the challenge itself would 
be successful.)34
Nonetheless, there is at least one respect in which adoption might be 
considered to be an incident of marriage if a state does not permit 
second-parent adoptions. To see this point, a little background is 
required. Traditionally, whenever someone adopted a child, the 
biological parents had to surrender their parental rights.35 However, there 
is an exception to this rule—every state permits stepparent adoptions,36 
i.e., permits a spouse of a parent to adopt the parent’s child without 
forcing the parent to surrender parental rights. For example, assume that 
Wanda lost her husband years ago and has now remarried. Her current 
husband, William, wishes to adopt her children. Assuming that Wanda 
supports the adoption and that the adoption would promote the interests 
of the children, William will be permitted to adopt the children without 
Wanda being forced to give up her own parental rights. This is quite 
sensible, given that both Wanda and William will be raising the children. 
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that Wanda lives next door to 
another widow named Sandy. Sandy is living with—but not married to—
a man, Samuel, who wants to adopt her children. Suppose further that (1) 
Sandy supports the adoption, (2) the adoption would promote the best 
interests of her children, and (3) Sandy and Samuel are as committed to 
each other as are Wanda and William. The issue of interest here is 
whether there would be any significance to a state’s refusal to extend the 
stepparent exception so that Samuel could adopt Sandy’s children 
without Sandy’s having to surrender parental rights, i.e., whether a 
state’s refusal to permit second-parent adoptions might have any 
implications for what might be considered an incident of marriage. 
Again, let us consider Florida law, which permits a stepparent to 
adopt his or her spouse’s child without the spouse being forced to 
surrender parental rights.37 While there seems to be no statute or reported 
case law directly on point,38 it seems unlikely Florida would permit an 
 
 34. See Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (upholding Florida’s adoption law). 
 35. Mark Strasser, Marriage, Parental Rights, and Public Policy: On the FMA, Its Purported 
Justification, and Its Likely Effects on Families, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 118, 128 (2004) 
(“Traditionally, whenever a child was adopted, the parental rights of the biological parents were 
terminated.”). 
 36. Wendee M. Hilderbrand, When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The 
Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 1907, 1919 (2003) (noting that all of the states permits stepparent adoptions under certain 
conditions). 
 37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(c)(1) (West 2005). 
 38. The Florida statute does not address this kind of case, see id. at § 63.042, and a Westlaw 
search does not reveal any cases dealing with the issue. 
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unmarried individual to adopt his or her partner’s child without that 
partner’s being forced to surrender parental rights. If Florida would not 
allow that kind of adoption, then a stepparent adoption would likely be 
viewed as an incident of marriage under Florida law. 
Recently, Florida’s law banning gays and lesbians from adopting 
children was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.39 Suppose, however, that 
the Eleventh Circuit had reached a different conclusion or, perhaps, that 
the United States Supreme Court decided in a different case that such 
bans violated federal constitutional guarantees. A separate question 
would be whether the FMPA would immunize a state’s refusal to permit 
second-parent adoptions from constitutional review. Arguably, it would. 
Thus, even if a state’s prohibiting adoptions by gays or lesbians would 
violate equal protection guarantees, the FMPA might immunize from 
constitutional review a decision by a state to preclude the members of a 
non-marital couple from each establishing parental rights to the same 
child. Basically, according to one interpretation of the amendment, the 
FMPA would carve out from federal or state constitutional review a 
state’s decision not to accord the incidents of marriage to any non-
marital couple, even assuming that the decision could not pass muster 
under equal protection or due process analysis.40
Suppose that it were claimed that the incidents of marriage should 
not be determined in light of which benefits are reserved for married 
couples by a particular state but, instead, should be understood to involve 
certain core areas, such as custody, adoption, support, and property 
division.41 This might mean that a state’s refusal to permit non-married 
individuals to have benefits in these areas would be immune from 
constitutional review.42 Indeed, not only might a state’s refusal to allow 
all unmarried individuals to adopt or have custody be immune from 
constitutional scrutiny, but a state’s decision to allow only certain 
unmarried individuals to adopt or have custody might be immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. In short, a possible interpretation of the FMPA is 
that states’ decisions with respect to which unmarried individuals would 
 
 39. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 40. Cf. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 615 (“This drastic step—repealing the 
protections of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—is, of course, what the proponents of a 
Federal Marriage Amendment implicitly have proposed.”). 
 41. See generally Wardle, supra note 4, at 167. 
 42. But see Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1903 (2005) (“[T]he Twenty-first 
Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); Krotoszynski, Jr. & 
Spitko, supra note 3, at 602 (“Because a Federal Marriage Amendment would contravene the deeply 
embedded constitutional ideals of equal protection and due process, it would invite a narrow 
interpretation that might undercut its effectiveness at preserving marriage rights for heterosexual 
relationships only.”). 
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receive any of the benefits within the “incidents of marriage” category 
would be free from constitutional challenge: States could discriminate on 
the basis of orientation, sex, race, religion, etc., without fear that their 
laws would be struck down as violating state or federal constitutional 
guarantees. 
There might be significant ramifications were the FMPA interpreted 
to exempt the non-awarding of certain core benefits to the unmarried 
from constitutional review. Not only might equal protection guarantees 
be rendered inoperable with respect to the withholding of benefits to 
particular unmarried individuals, but substantive due process guarantees 
might be similarly so treated. Consider the right to custody of one’s 
biological child, a fundamental interest with which the state cannot 
interfere without compelling justification.43 If custody is an incident of 
marriage, then statutes adversely affecting the custodial rights of the 
unmarried might be immunized from state and federal constitutional 
scrutiny. Were a state legislature to decide that the parental rights of 
never-married parents should be terminated so that their children could 
be placed in marital homes, there would be no recourse to constitutional 
protections. 
Suppose that the FMPA had been adopted and the facts of Stanley v. 
Illinois44 were before the Court. The mother of three children dies.45 The 
father of the children with whom she had been living but whom she had 
never married is presumed by the state’s laws to be an unfit parent.46 He 
challenges the law. While the Stanley Court struck down the statute,47 the 
Supreme Court might now have to uphold the law, because the equal 
protection48 and due process49 guarantees of the Federal Constitution 
 
 43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case-the 
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
 44. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 45. Id. at 646. 
 46. See id. at 647 (“The State continues to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to 
raise their children and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether 
particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their children.”). 
 47. See id. at 649. 
 48. The Stanley Court struck down the law as a violation of equal protection guarantees. See 
id. at 649 (“[B]y denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their 
children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 49. The Stanley Court suggested that the Due Process Clause also established the 
unconstitutionality of the statute in question. See id. at 657-58. 
We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here. The State’s interest in 
caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists 
on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient 
to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to 
justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his 
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would simply be inapplicable when the custodial rights of an unmarried 
parent were at issue. The Court might recognize that the application of 
this law would result in the children’s losing both of their parents—one 
through death and the other through the operation of law—but would 
note that this regrettable result speaks to the wisdom of the statute, a 
matter to be addressed to the Legislature rather than the Court. 
 Perhaps the FMPA would not permit invidious discrimination. 
This would depend upon how it was interpreted and whether, for 
example, it would be interpreted to repeal all constitutional guarantees 
with respect to a defined set of benefits for those who were not married. 
Given how some state and federal constitutional provisions have been 
interpreted, it seems clear that some members of the Court would 
interpret the FMPA to permit states to pass arguably invidiously 
discriminatory legislation,50 although it is simply unclear whether that 
view would be shared by a majority on the Court. 
 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
 
Recently, several states amended their state constitutions to preclude 
the recognition of same-sex marriage. Those amendments have required 
interpretation, and some interpretations now appear in case law. Further, 
during the past several years, the United States Supreme Court has been 
significantly revising its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
state and federal courts’ interpretations of these amendments should not 
give comfort to anyone predicting that the FMPA will be construed in a 
particular way. On the contrary, the interpretations offered of some of the 
state amendments and the current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence 
should make everyone wary of how the FMPA might be interpreted by 
the courts. 
 
A.  State Constitutional Interpretation 
 
In 2004, several states adopted constitutional amendments respecting 
marriage.51 While each was designed to prohibit same-sex marriages, the 
 
family. 
Id. 
 50. In both Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), the majority struck down what it viewed as invidiously discriminatory legislation. In both 
cases, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas believed the legislation permissible, even without the 
FMPA. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). It would not be difficult to imagine that these Justices would read the amendment as 
immunizing certain kinds of restrictions from constitutional review. 
 51. Same-sex marriage: Simply put, he explained, ECONOMIST 82, 3/19/05, 2005 WLNR 
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content of the various amendments differed and their scope required 
interpretation by the courts. Some of the state court interpretations 
should give pause to those pushing for the adoption of the FMPA. 
In November of 2004, the following constitutional amendment was 
passed by referendum in Ohio: 
 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage 
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This 
state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal 
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.52
 
Ohio courts have tried to spell out the effects of this amendment. For 
example, one issue on which courts have not been able to agree is 
whether the amendment invalidates the application of the state’s 
domestic violence statute to non-marital couples. Some courts have 
concluded that the second sentence of the amendment precludes the state 
from extending to non-marital, cohabiting partners the protections that 
would be extended to a spouse,53 while others have concluded that the 
amendment does not preclude the extension of such benefits.54
The claim here is not that being free from domestic violence should 
be thought a benefit reserved for married couples. Indeed, at common 
law, one spouse would be immune from civil suit by the other spouse for 
injuries which would have been actionable had the individuals never 
married,55 so protection from domestic violence does not seem to be one 
of the paradigmatic incidents of marriage. Nonetheless, if the language of 
the Ohio amendment can be construed to preclude protection against 
domestic violence for non-marital couples, the FMPA would likely be 
analogously construed by some courts, e.g., to suggest that a failure to 
provide domestic violence protection to the unmarried is immune from 
 
4227351 (“Of the 17 states that have changed their constitutions to ban same-sex marriages, only 
Nebraska, Nevada, Alaska and Hawaii did so before 2004. The other 13 did so in 2004—the year not 
just of the San Francisco change but also of same-sex legalisation in Massachusetts.”). 
 52. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
 53. See City of Cleveland v. Voies, No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135 (Ohio Mun. 
Mar. 23, 2005); State v. Peterson, No. 2004 CR 873, 2005 WL 1940114 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 18, 2005); 
State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 26, 2005); State v. 
Steineman, 2005 CR 0068, 2005 WL 1940104 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 26, 2005). 
 54. See State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio App. Dec. 20, 2005); State v. 
Newell, No. 2004 CA 00264, 2005 WL 1364937, at 4 (Ohio App. May 31, 2005); City of Cleveland 
v. Knipp, No. 2004 CRB 039103, 2005 WL 1017620 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10, 2005); State v. Rogers, 
827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Misc. 2005); State v. McIntosh, No. 2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio 
C.P. Apr. 18, 2005). 
 55. See generally Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 953 (N.J. 1978). 
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constitutional challenge. 
If the FMPA could be interpreted to immunize the failure to extend 
domestic violence protections to non-marital couples, one might wonder 
what other benefits might also be so treated. For example, consider the 
Nebraska constitutional amendment, which is as follows: “Only marriage 
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. 
The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic 
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or 
recognized in Nebraska.”56
The Nebraska Attorney General interpreted the amendment as 
precluding the legislature from giving a domestic partner the right to 
control the disposition of a decedent’s remains.57 A host of other 
benefits, e.g. hospital visitation and medical decision-making, were also 
at least arguably affected by the State Attorney General’s broad 
interpretation of the amendment.58
It is unclear whether the Nebraska amendment was intended to be 
given this broad scope. Suppose, however, that it had been so intended 
and suppose further that it had been adopted for invidious reasons. If the 
FMPA were passed, such broad statutes or amendments, if drafted in a 
particular way, might be immunized from constitutional review. 
The FMPA language targets the “incidents of marriage” and does not 
even mention same-sex relationships. If a state adopted legislation which 
precluded same-sex but not different-sex unmarried couples from 
receiving certain benefits, the FMPA presumably would not apply and 
the classification might be challenged on constitutional grounds.59 
However, if instead the state decided to reserve certain benefits only for 
married couples, that legislative decision might be immune from 
constitutional scrutiny, even if that classification were enacted for 
invidious reasons. 
Proponents of the FMPA often claim that it is necessary to preserve 
different-sex marriage.60 Suppose that we bracket that permitting same-
 
 56. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. 
Bruning, 368 F.Supp. 2d 980 (D.Neb. 2005). 
 57. See Citizens for Equal Protection, 368 F. Supp.2d at 987-88 (D.Neb. 2005). 
 58. Cf. id. at 1000 (suggesting that the amendment might preclude “passage of legislation 
that would make domestic partners responsible for each others’ living expenses; allow a partner 
hospital visitation; provide for a partner to make decisions regarding health care, organ donations 
and funeral arrangements; permit bereavement leave; permit private employer benefits; allow 
survivorship, intestacy and elective share; and permit same-sex couples to adopt children”). 
 59. But see supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (suggesting that if incidents of marriage are 
construed as picking out certain benefits rather than as being determined in light of the benefits 
reserved for marital couples, then constitutional challenges might not be available even if certain 
benefits are accorded to some but not all unmarried individuals). 
 60. W. Todd Akin, Debunking “Conservative” Arguments Against the Federal Marriage 
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sex couples to marry will not somehow preclude different-sex couples 
from marrying. Suppose that we also bracket the implausibility of the 
claims either that different-sex couples will not marry if same-sex 
couples are permitted to do so or that different-sex couples will divorce 
when they otherwise would not have if same-sex couples are permitted to 
marry.61 It should be clear that passing an amendment which could 
remove possible constitutional protections for visiting loved ones in the 
hospital or, perhaps, for disposing of the remains of a loved one is not 
only not going to save marriage but is heartless and cruel. 
If the sole issue were the importance of preserving marriage for 
different-sex couples,62 one would expect that the “incidents of 
marriage” language in the second sentence of the FMPA would be 
unnecessary. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the 
majority of Americans wish to preserve marriage for different-sex 
couples but do not feel the same way with respect to the allocation of the 
benefits of marriage.63
 
B.  How Would a Carefully Crafted Amendment Be Interpreted by the 
Federal Courts? 
 
While the state constitutional amendments have been construed in a 
variety of ways, it might be thought that a federal amendment would be 
narrowly construed. Yet, a brief consideration of Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence illustrates that even a better–crafted amendment might be 
interpreted in a variety of ways. 
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: 
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”64
This amendment might seem relatively straightforward.65 On its face, 
 
Amendment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 219, 221 (2004) (“[W]e must pursue a 
Federal Marriage Amendment . . . to preserve the institution of marriage . . . .”). 
 61. Cf. Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and 
Fundamental Interests, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 313, 323 (1998) (recognizing same-sex marriages 
“would be unlikely to undermine other relationships and it would be most surprising, for example, 
for opposite-sex couples to seek divorces because same-sex couples had been allowed to marry”). 
 62. See Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 
2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 7 (2004) (suggesting that most Americans wish to preserve marriage for 
different-sex couples). 
 63. See id. at 9 (“One recent poll shows that 55 percent think that there should be Social 
Security benefits for gay partners. Only 36 percent are opposed.”). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 65. For a discussion of why the language “shall not be construed” makes the amendment 
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it suggests that the federal courts will not have jurisdiction to hear a suit 
by a citizen of one state against another state. The amendment says 
nothing about a citizen suing her own state nor does it say anything about 
a state’s being able to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts by 
agreeing to be sued there. Yet, the Court has interpreted the amendment 
to bar suits by citizens against their own states66 and to not bar suits by 
citizens of other states if the state has no objection to appearing in federal 
court.67
A consideration of the historical context in which the amendment 
was adopted suggests that the amendment might have been adopted to 
limit the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.68 Be that as it may, the 
current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence does not closely follow the 
text.69
What implications does this have for the FMPA? First, the Court 
may well not feel bound by the text,70 which means that the Court might 
offer a broad range of interpretations of the text. For example, the Court 
might read the amendment as a partial limitation on Fourteenth 
Amendment protections or, perhaps, might take a very different approach 
and read the amendment as imposing restrictions on different-sex 
marriages because of equal protection guarantees.71
At least one of the lessons of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is 
that the Court may not feel constrained by the words of the amendment 
and instead may try to capture what it symbolizes.72 This means that it 
much less clear than might originally be supposed, see Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers, and Eleventh 
Amendment Jurisprudence: On Justification, Rationalization and Sovereign Immunity, 10 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 251, 254-56 (2001). 
 66. Idaho v. Coeur D’alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (“[W]e have extended a 
State’s protection from suit to suits brought by the State’s own citizens.”). 
 67. Id. at 267 (rejecting “that the Eleventh Amendment, like the grant of Article III, § 2, 
jurisdiction, is cast in terms of reach or competence, so the federal courts are altogether disqualified 
from hearing certain suits brought against a State”). 
 68. See generally Mark Strasser, Chisholm, The Eleventh Amendment, and Sovereign 
Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605 (2001). 
 69. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999) (“Although the text of the Amendment 
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have 
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the 
presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 
779 (1991))). 
 70. Cf. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 620 (2005) (“The lesson here is quite 
clear: the Supreme Court does not hold itself bound to traditional canons of statutory interpretation 
when interpreting constitutional text.”). 
 71. Id. at 625 (“We conclude that neither version of the Federal Marriage Amendment would 
preclude a future Supreme Court from holding that a state’s failure to recognize same-sex marriage 
while recognizing mixed-sex marriage constitutes invidious sex discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 72. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand 
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it 
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might be very difficult for those proposing the amendment to achieve 
particular defined ends, even if they are very careful in how they craft the 
language of the amendment. Yet, the FMPA is not particularly well 
crafted, since it leaves so much open to interpretation. No one can say 
what the Court would do if forced to interpret the amendment—the only 
safe bet is that some would be very surprised by the Court’s decision. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment is unwise for a variety 
of reasons. Its scope is extremely unclear, as is illustrated by some of the 
interpretations that have been given to state marriage amendments. 
Further, there is reason to believe that the United States Supreme Court 
would not feel particularly constrained by the amendment’s language, 
even were it not so open to interpretation. 
FMPA proponents have offered a variety of reasons for the 
amendment, but many of those reasons do not withstand scrutiny. Were 
federalism really the goal, the amendment would not attempt to tie the 
hands of the states in how they amended their own constitutions. Were 
protecting marriage the goal, the amendment (1) would do something 
which was more likely to protect marriage in fact, and (2) would not 
enable states to impose cruel burdens on disfavored minorities. 
Because the focus of this discussion has been on whether passage of 
the FMPA is wise, very little attention has been paid to the merits of 
recognizing same-sex marriage. Perhaps a few words on that matter 
should be included. 
Maggie Gallagher argues that married couples receive certain 
benefits because of the “law’s perception of spouses as each others’ 
closest kin. The law is doing justice to the relation that actually exists 
between spouses . . . , rather than creating a basket of legal goodies to 
help reward married couples.”73 This is at least one of the reasons that 
same-sex couples should have the right to marry—the law should do 
justice to the relation that actually exists. Same-sex couples have the 
same kinds of relationships that different-sex couples have. They may 
have children to raise or elderly parents who need their care. They may 
wish to cement their union as a matter of religious belief and, indeed, 
may be able to celebrate their union within their faith tradition. They 
seek to marry for many of the same reasons that different-sex couples 
seek to marry and have many of the same roles, e.g., as caring parent, 
 
confirms . . . .”). 
 73. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A 
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 39 (2004). 
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child or helpmate, as do members of other couples. 
Some FMPA proponents suggest that it is anti-family to point out 
that many married couples do not have children, and that many children 
are not being raised by both of their biological parents.74 Such a 
suggestion is regrettable for several reasons. The United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that the “demographic changes of the past century 
make it difficult to speak of an average American family” and that the 
“composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”75 
Pretending that the “average American family” is other than what it is 
will not change the nature of that family. However, it may result in many 
American families having a much harder time staying together and in 
many parents having a much harder time providing for their children, 
results which no one should want. 
The FMPA is exactly the sort of amendment which should not be 
proposed and certainly should not be adopted. One can only hope that the 
Congress and the American people will continue to have the wisdom to 
reject this Pandora’s box, whose foreseeable consequences are not 
pleasant to contemplate and whose currently unforeseeable consequences 
would likely produce lamentations even from those who had once been 
its supporters. 
 
 
 74. Id. at 61 (suggesting that the importance of procreation and its relationship to marriage 
are downgraded by the observation that many children are raised by single parents and in homes in 
which one of the parents has no biological connection to the child). 
 75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
